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Abstract. Adversarial attacks of deep neural networks have been intensively
studied on image, audio, natural language, patch, and pixel classification tasks.
Nevertheless, as a typical while important real-world application, the adversarial
attacks of online video object tracking that traces an object’s moving trajectory
instead of its category are rarely explored. In this paper, we identify a new task for
the adversarial attack to visual tracking: online generating imperceptible pertur-
bations that mislead trackers along with an incorrect (Untargeted Attack, UA) or
specified trajectory (Targeted Attack, TA). To this end, we first propose a spatial-
aware basic attack by adapting existing attack methods, i.e., FGSM, BIM, and
C&W, and comprehensively analyze the attacking performance. We identify that
online object tracking poses two new challenges: 1) it is difficult to generate im-
perceptible perturbations that can transfer across frames, and 2) real-time trackers
require the attack to satisfy a certain level of efficiency. To address these chal-
lenges, we further propose the spatial-aware online incremental attack (a.k.a.
SPARK) that performs spatial-temporal sparse incremental perturbations online
and makes the adversarial attack less perceptible. In addition, as an optimization-
based method, SPARK quickly converges to very small losses within several iter-
ations by considering historical incremental perturbations, making it much more
efficient than basic attacks. The in-depth evaluation of state-of-the-art trackers
(i.e., SiamRPN++ with AlexNet, MobileNetv2, and ResNet-50, and SiamDW)
on OTB100, VOT2018, UAV123, and LaSOT demonstrates the effectiveness and
transferability of SPARK in misleading the trackers under both UA and TA with
minor perturbations.
Keywords: Online incremental attack, Visual object tracking, Adversarial attack
1 Introduction
While deep learning achieves tremendous success over the past decade, the recently
intensive investigation on image processing tasks e.g., image classification [51,17,41],
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object detection [58], and semantic segmentation [39], reveal that the state-of-the-art
deep neural networks (DNNs) are still vulnerable from adversarial examples. The minor
perturbations on an image, although often imperceptible by human beings, can easily
fool a DNN classifier, detector or segmentation analyzer, resulting in incorrect deci-
sions. This leads to great concerns especially when a DNN is applied in the safety- and
security-critical scenarios. For a particular task, the domain-specific study and the un-
derstanding of how adversarial attacks influence a DNN’s performance would be a key
to reduce such impacts towards further robustness enhancement [55].
Besides image processing tasks, recent studies also emerge to investigate the adver-
sarial attacks to other diverse types of tasks, e.g., speech recognition [4,46,6], natural
language processing [26,47,60], continuous states in reinforcement learning [49], action
recognition and object detection [55,54]. Visual object tracking (VOT), which performs
online object localization and moving trajectory identification, is a typical while impor-
tant component in many safety- and security-critical applications, with urgent industrial
demands, e.g., autonomous driving, video surveillance, general-purpose cyber-physical
systems. For example, a VOT is often embedded into a self-driving car or unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) as a key perception component, that drives the system to follow
a target object (see Fig. 1). Adversarial examples could mislead the car or UAV with
incorrect perceptions, causing navigation into dangerous environments and even result-
ing in severe accidents. Therefore, it is of great importance to perform a comprehensive
study of adversarial attacks on visual object tracking. To this date, however, there exist
limited studies on the influence of the adversarial attack on VOT relevant tasks, without
which the deployed real-world systems would be exposed to high potential safety risks.
Different from image, speech and natural language processing tasks, online ob-
ject tracking poses several new challenges to the adversarial attack techniques. First,
compared with existing sequential-input-relevant tasks, e.g., audios [4], natural lan-
guages [26] or videos [55] for classification that have access to the complete sequential
data, object tracking processes incoming frames one by one in order. When a current
frame t is under attack, all the previous frames (i.e., {1, 2 . . . t − 1}) are already ana-
lyzed and cannot be changed. At the same time, the future frames (i.e., {t+1, . . .}) are
still unavailable and cannot be immediately attacked as well. With limited temporal data
segments and the dynamic scene changes, it is even more difficult to generate imper-
ceptible yet effective adversarial perturbations that can transfer over time (i.e., multiple
consecutive frames). In addition, the object tracking often depends on a target desig-
nated object template cropped from the first frame of a video [1,32] for further analysis.
The different initially designated object might lead to different tracking analysis, which
renders the universal adversarial perturbation [41] often ineffective.
Furthermore, object tracking usually functions at real-time speed. Thus, it requires
the attacks to be efficient enough so that the adversarial perturbation of the current frame
can be completed before the next frame arrives. Although the gradient descent-based
methods (e.g., FGSM [17], BIM [30]) are demonstrated to be effective in attacking
the image classifier, they still encounter efficiency issues in fooling the state-of-the-art
trackers when multiple frames quickly arrive.
It is also rather expensive for attacking on multiple frames in real-time [55].
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Fig. 1: An example of our adversarial attack to online VOT that drives an UAV [43] to move along the targeted
trajectory (the blue line), which causes divergence from the object moving path (the green line). The perturbations
are enlarged by ×255 for better visualization.
To better understand the challenges and uniqueness in attacking the VOT, we first
propose a spatial-aware basic attack method by adapting the existing state-of-the-art
attacking techniques (i.e., FGSM, BIM, C&W) that are used to attack each frame in-
dividually. Our empirical study confirms that the basic attack is indeed ineffective for
attacking the VOT, due to the consecutive temporal frames in real-time. Based on this,
we further propose the spatial-aware online incremental attack (SPARK) method that
can generate more imperceptible perturbations online in terms of both effectiveness and
efficiency. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We formalize the adversarial attack problem for the VOT, i.e., generating imper-
ceptible perturbations online to mislead visual trackers that traces an object, into an
incorrect (Untargeted Attack, UA) or specified (Targeted Attack, TA) trajectory.
– We propose several basic attacks by adapting existing attacks (i.e., FGSM, BIM,
C&W) and further perform an empirical study for better understanding challenges
of adversarial attacks on real-time object tracking.
– We propose a new spatial-aware online incremental attack (SPARK) method that
can efficiently generate imperceptible perturbations for real-time VOT.
– In line with the basic methods, our in-depth evaluation demonstrates the effective-
ness and efficiency of SPARK in attacking the state-of-the-art SiamRPN++ trackers
with AlexNet, MobileNetv2, and ResNet-50 models [32,31] and SiamDW trackers
[63] under UA and TA. The generated attacks also exhibit strong transferability to
the online updating variants of SiamRPN trackers.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Examples. Extensive studies have shown the vulnerability of DNN from
adversarial attacks [35]. [51] initially shown the existence of adversarial attacks, and
[17] proposed an efficient one-step method FGSM, that was later improved via iter-
ative method [30] and momentum term [10]. Similarly, [45] proposed the Jacobian-
based saliency map attack with high success rate, while [3] realized effective attack by
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optimization methods (C&W) under different norms. Further adversarial attacks were
extended to tasks like object detection [58,33,64], semantic segmentation [58,40], and
testing techniques for DNNs [38,59,11].
Recent works also confirmed the existence of adversarial examples in sequential
data processing, e.g., speech recognition [6,4,46], natural language [16,26], and video
processing [55]. Different from these works, our attack aims at misleading trackers with
limited online data access, i.e., the future frames are unavailable, the past frames cannot
be attacked either. Among the most relevant work to ours, [55] proposed the L2,1 norm-
based attack to generate sparse perturbations for action recognition, under the condition
that the whole video data is available and the perturbations of multiple frames can be
jointly tuned. To further show the difference, we implement a tracking attack with [55]
and compare it in the evaluation. [33] attacked the region proposal network (RPN) that
is also used in the SiamRPN trackers [32]. However, this attack focuses on fooling
image detectors to predict inaccurate bounding boxes, thus cannot be directly used to
attack trackers aiming to mislead to an incorrect trajectory with online videos. [54]
proposed the video object detection attack by addressing each frame independently,
which is not suitable for online tracking where the tracker often runs at real-time speed.
Another related work [34] studied when to attack an agent in the reinforcement learning
context. In contrast, this work mainly explores how to use temporal constraints to online
generate imperceptible and effective perturbations to mislead real-time trackers.
Visual Object Tracking Visual tracking is a fundamental problem in computer vi-
sion, estimating positions of an object (specified at the first frame) over frames [57].
The state-of-the-art trackers can be roughly summarized to three categories, including
correlation filter-based [8,37,5,61,14,20], classification & updating-based [44,19,48]
and Siamese network-based trackers [1,18,65,53,52,13]. Among these works, Siamese
network-based methods learn the matching models offline and track objects without
updating parameters, which well balances the efficiency and accuracy. In particular,
the SiamRPN tracker can adapt objects’ aspect ratio changing and run beyond real
time [32]. In this paper, we choose SiamRPN++ [31] with AlexNet, MobileNetv2, and
ResNet-50 as subject models due to following reasons: 1) SiamRPN++ trackers are
widely adopted with high potential to real-world applications [27,31]. The study of
attacking to improve their robustness is crucial for industrial deployment with safety
concerns. 2) Compared with other frameworks (e.g., correlation filter-based trackers),
SiamRPN is a near end-to-end deep architecture with fewer hyper-parameters, making
it more suitable to investigate the attacks. In addition to SiamRPN++, we attack another
state-of-the-art tracker, i.e., SiamDW [63], to show the generalization of our method.
Difference to PAT [56]. To the best of our knowledge, until now, there has been
a limited study on attacking online object tracking. [56] generated physical adversar-
ial textures (PAT) via white-box attack to let the GOTURN tracker [23] lock on the
texture when a tracked object moves in front of it. The main differences between our
method and PAT are: (1) Their attack objectives are distinctly and totally different. As
shown in Fig. 2, PAT is to generate perceptible texture and let the GOTURN tracker lock
on it while our method is to online produce imperceptible perturbations that mislead
state-of-the-art trackers, e.g., SiamRPN++ [31], along an incorrect or specified trajec-
tory. (2) Different theoretical novelties. PAT is to improve an existing Expectation Over
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Fig. 2: Difference between PAT [56] and our method. PAT produces perceptible pattern.and let the GOTURN tracker
lock on the texture. The adversarial perturbations of SPARK are imperceptible and hardly perceived.
Transformation (EOT)-based attack by studying the need to randomize over different
transformation variables. Our work intends to perform a comprehensive study on adapt
existing adversarial attacks on object tracking and reveal the new challenges in this im-
portant task. We then proposed a novel method, i.e., spatial-aware online incremental
attack, which can address these challenges properly. (3) Different subject models. PAT
validates its method by attacking a light deep regression tracker, i.e., GOTURN that has
low tracking accuracy on modern benchmarks [12,57,27]. We use our method to attack
the state-of-the-art trackers, e.g., SiamRPN++ [31] and SiamDW [63].
3 Spatial-aware Online Adversarial Attack
3.1 Problem Definition
Let V = {Xt}T1 be an online video with T frames, where Xt is the tth frame. Given
a tracker φθ(·) with parameters θ, we crop an object template T (i.e., the target object)
from the first frame. The tracker is tasked to predict bounding boxes that tightly wrap
the object in further incoming frames.
To locate the object at frame t, the tracker calculates {(yit,bit)}Ni=1 = φθ(Xt,T),
where {bit ∈ <4×1}Ni=1 are N object candidates in Xt and yit indicates the positive
activation of the ith candidate (i.e., bit). We denote the tracker’s predictive bounding
box of the target object at the clean tth frame by bgtt ∈ <4×1 and the object tracker
assigns the predictive result OT (Xt,T) = b
gt
t = b
k
t , where k = argmax1≤i≤N (y
i
t),
i.e., the bounding box with highest activate value is selected as the predictive object at
frame t. The above tracking process covers most of the state-of-the-art trackers, e.g.,
Siamese network-based trackers [62,9,13,63,31,21,1] and correlation filter-based track-
ers [7,50,18]. We define the adversarial attacks on tracking as follows:
Untargeted Attack (UA). UA is to generate adversarial examples {Xat}T1 such that
∀1 ≤ t ≤ T , IoU(OT (Xat ,T),bgtt ) = 0, where IoU(·) is the Intersection over Union
between two bounding boxes.
Targeted Attack (TA). Suppose a targeted trajectory {ptrt }T1 desires the trajectory
we hope the attacked tracker to output, e.g., the blue line in Fig. 1. TA is to generate
adversarial examples {Xat}T1 such that ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T , ce(OT (Xat ,T)) = ptrt , where
ce(·) shows the center position of the bounding box and ptrt depicts the targeted position
at the tth frame.
Intuitively, UA is to make the trackers predict incorrect bounding boxes of a target
object at all frames by adding small distortions to online captured frames while TA
aims to intentionally drive trackers to output desired object positions specified by the
targeted trajectory.
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Fig. 3: Analysis of our basic attack (BA) and spatial-aware online incremental attack (SPARK). (a) shows the dis-
tance between the targeted position and predicted object position after attacking. A smaller distance means the
attack is more effective. (b) shows the mean absolute perturbation of each frame. A smaller MAP leads to less im-
perceptible perturbation. (c) presents the adversarial perturbations of 4 attack methods at frame 49, corresponding
adversarial examples, and response maps from SiamRPN-AlexNet. (d) includes the incremental perturbations from
frame 41 to 49 and the loss values at each frame. The perturbations are enlarged by×255 for better visualization.
3.2 Basic Attack
We first propose the basic attacks by adapting existing adversarial methods at each
frame. To attack a tracker OT (·), we can use another tracker OT ′(·) to generate adver-
sarial examples. For untargeted attack (UA), at frame t, we formally define the problem
of finding an adversarial example as follows:
minimize D(Xt,Xt +Et) (1)
subject to IoU(OT ′(Xt +Et,T),b
gt′
t ) = 0 (2)
where Xat = Xt + Et and Et is the desired distortion that changes the result of the
tracker and D is a distance metric. We follow the setup of FGSM and use the L∞
norm as D. We use bgt′t as the predictive result on the clean frame Xt. When OT (·) =
OT ′(·), we consider the attack as a white-box attack.
To achieve the UA, we define the objective function fua such that IoU(OT ′(Xt +
Et,T),b
gt′) = 0 if and only if fua(Xt +Et,T) < 0:
fua(Xt +Et,T) = y
gt′
t − max
IoU(bit,b
gt′
t )=0
(yit) (3)
where {(yit,bit)}Ni=1 = φθ′(Xt + Et,T), θ′ denotes parameters of OT ′(·), and ygt
′
t
is the activation value of bgt
′
t at the perturbed frame t. For the targeted attack (TA), at
frame t, we define the problem of finding a targeted adversarial example as follows:
minimize D(Xt,Xt +Et) (4)
subject to ce(OT ′(Xt +Et,T)) = ptrt (5)
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Table 1: Comparing basic attacks, i.e., BA-E, BA-R1, and BA-R2 with our SPARK under TA on the OTB100 dataset.
BA-E BA-R1 BA-R2
SPARK
FGSM BIM C&W FGSM BIM C&W FGSM BIM C&W
Succ. Rate (%) 8.0 69.6 57.7 6.6 17.8 17.5 6.7 53.7 23.5 78.9
Mean Absolute Perturbation 1.24 5.88 1.31 1.23 5.96 0.26 1.23 3.36 1.27 1.04
Aver. Iter. Num per frame 1 10 10 0.10 0.95 0.94 0.10 4.6 4.6 2.25
Aver. Cost per frame (ms) 56.2 326.0 264.0 5.50 39.1 24.8 5.68 189.5 121.4 62.1
where ptrt is the targeted position at frame t and ce(·) outputs the center position of
a bounding box. To achieve the goal, we define the objective function f ta such that
ce(OT ′(Xt +Et,T)) = ptrt if and only if f
ta(Xt +Et,T) < 0:
f ta(Xt +Et,T) = y
gt′
t − max
ce(bit)=p
tr
t
(yit) (6)
To perform the basic tracking attack, FGSM [17], BIM [30] and C&W [3] are
adapted to optimize the objective functions (i.e., Eq. (3) and Eq. (6)). In this paper,
we mainly focus on the white-box attack on visual object tracking by setting OT (·) =
OT ′(·) while studying the transferability of different trackers in the experiments.
3.3 Empirical Study
In the following, we perform an empirical study on evaluating the effectiveness of the
basic attack. In particular, we study two research questions: 1) how effective is the attack
by applying basic attack on each frame? 2) how is its impact of the temporal frames in
the video? To answer the questions, we perform two kinds of basic targeted attacks on
a state-of-the-art tracker, i.e., SiamRPN-AlexNet‖:
BA-E: Online attacking each frame by using FGSM, BIM, and C&W to optimize
Eq. (6), respectively.
BA-R: Randomly select some frames and perform the basic attack on these frames
using FGSM, BIM, and C&W. For frames between two selected frames, we use the
perturbation from the first selected one to distort frames in the interval and see if basic
attacks could transfer across time. For example, we attack 1st and 10th frames with
basic attacks while distorting the 2th to 9th frames with the perturbation of 1st frame.
Note that BA-E and BA-R can answer the two questions, respectively. To be spe-
cific, we have configured two BA-R attacks. First, each frame is selected to be attacked
with a probability 0.1 (denoted as BA-R1). Second, we perform the basic attack with
an interval 10, i.e., attack at the 1th, 11th, 21th, . . . frame (denoted as BA-R2).
Table 1 shows the success rate, mean absolute perturbation, and average iteration
per frame of BA-E, BA-R1, and BA-R2 for attacking SiamRPN-AlexNet-based tracker
on OTB100 under TA. We see that: 1) BA-E methods via BIM and C&W get high
success rate by attacking each frame. Nevertheless, their perturbations are large and
attacking each frame with 10 iterations is time-consuming and beyond real-time tracker.
Although FGSM is efficient, its success rate is much lower. 2) Randomly attacking 10%
frames, i.e., BA-R1, is about 10 times faster than BA-E. However, the success rate drops
‖We select SiamRPN-AlexNet, since it is a representative Siamese network based-tracker and
achieves high accuracy on modern tracking benchmarks with beyond real-time speed.
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significantly. 3) BA-R2 method attacking at every 10 frames is efficient while sacrificing
the success rate. Compared with BA-R1, with the same attacking rate, i.e., 10% frames,
BA-R2 has higher success rate than BA-R1. For example, base on BIM, BA-R2 has
over two times larger success rate. It infers that perturbations of neighbor 10 frames
have some transferability due to the temporal smoothness.
A case study based on BIM is shown in Fig. 3, where we use the three BA at-
tacks to mislead the SiamRPN-AlexNet to locate an interested object at the top left of
the scene (targeted position in Fig. 3 (c)). Instead of following the standard tracking
pipeline, we crop the frame according to the ground truth and get a region where the
object are always at the center. We show the distance between the targeted position
(Fig. 3 (a)) and tracking results, and the mean absolute perturbation (MAP) (Fig. 3 (b))
at frame level. We reach consistent conclusion with Table 1. As the simplest solution,
BA-E attacks the tracker successfully at some time (distance to the targeted position is
less than 20) with the MAP around 5. However, the attack is inefficient and not suitable
for real-time tracking. In addition, according to Fig. 3 (c), the perturbations are large
and perceptible. The results answer the first question: attacking on each frame is not
effective, i.e., time-consuming and bigger MAP.
Consider the temporal property among frames, if the attack can be transferred be-
tween the adjacent frames, we could only attack some frames while reducing the over-
head, e.g., BA-R1 and BA-R2. Unfortunately, the results in Table 1 and Fig. 3 show that
BA-R1 and BA-R2 only work at the specific frames on which the attacks are performed.
The results answer the second question: the perturbations generated by BA is diffi-
cult to transfer to the next frames directly due to the dynamic scene in the video (see
the results from BA-R1 and BA-R2).
3.4 Online Incremental Attack
Base on the empirical study results from basic attacks, we identify that attacking on each
frame directly is not effective. As the frames are sequential and the nearby frames are
very similar, our deep analysis found that transferability exists between nearby frames.
However, how to effectively use the perturbations from previous frames while being
imperceptible when we attack a new coming frame is questionable. A straightforward
way is to add previous perturbations to a new calculated one, which will increase the
success rate of attacking but lead to significant distortions. To solve this problem, we
propose spatial-aware online incremental attack (SPARK) that generates more imper-
ceptible adversarial examples more efficiently for tracking. The intuition of SPARK
is that we still attack each frame, but apply previous perturbations on the new frame
combined with small but effective incremental perturbation via optimization.
At frame t, the UA with SPARK is formally defined as:
minimize D(Xt,Xt +Et−1 + t) (7)
subject to IoU(OT ′(Xt +Et−1 + t,T),b
gt′
t ) = 0 (8)
where Et−1 is the perturbation of the previous frame (i.e., t − 1th fame) and t is the
incremental perturbation. Here, the ‘incremental’ means t = Et−Et−1, and we further
haveEt = t+
∑t−1
t0
τ , where t0 = t−L and {τ}t−1t−L are L−1 previous incremental
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perturbations, and t0 = Et0 . We denote t0 = t − L as the start of an attack along the
timeline. Based on Eq. 3, we introduce a new objective function by using L2,1 norm to
regularize {τ}tt0 that leads to small and spatial-temporal sparse t.
fua(Xt + t +
t−1∑
t−L
τ ,T) + λ‖Γ‖2,1, (9)
where Γ = [t−L, ..., t−1, t] is a matrix that concatenates all incremental values.
Similarly, the TA with SPARK is formally defined as:
minimize D(Xt,Xt +Et−1 + t) (10)
subject to ce(OT ′(Xt +Et−1 + t,T)) = ptrt . (11)
We also modify the objective function Eq. 6 by adding the L2,1 norm and obtain
f ta(Xt + t +
t−1∑
t−L
τ ,T) + λ‖Γ‖2,1. (12)
We use the sign gradient descent to minimize the two objective functions, i.e., Eq. 9
and 12, with the step size of 0.3, followed by a clip operation. In Eq. 9 and 12, λ controls
the regularization degree and we set it to a constant 0.00001. Online minimizing Eq. 9
and 12 can be effective and efficient. First, optimizing the incremental perturbation is
equivalent to optimizing Et by regarding Et−1 as the start point. Since neighboring
frames of a video is usually similar, such start point helps get an effective perturbation
within very few iterations. Second, the L2,1 norm make incremental perturbations to be
spatial-temporal sparse and let Et to be more imperceptible. For example, when apply-
ing SPARK on the SiamRPN-AlexNet-based trackers, we find following observations:
Spatial-temporal sparsity of incremental perturbations: The incremental per-
turbations become gradually sparse along the space and time (see Fig. 3 (d)). This fa-
cilitates generating more imperceptible perturbations than BA methods. In addition,
SPARK gets the smallest MAP across all frames with higher success rate than BA-E on
OTB100 (see Fig. 3 (b)).
Efficient optimization: Fig. 3 (d) depicts the loss values during optimization from
frame 41 to 49. At frame 41, it takes about 7 iterations to converge. However, at other
frames, we obtain minimum loss in only two iterations. It enables more efficient attack
than BA methods. As presented in Table 1, SPARK only uses 2.25 iterations at average
to achieve 78.9% success rate.
The sparsity and efficiency of SPARK potentially avoid high-cost iterations at each
frame. In practice, we perform SPARK at every 30 frames∗∗ and calculate Et0 by opti-
mizing Eq. 9 or Eq. 12 with 10 iterations. In addition, we attack on the search region of
the attacked tracker instead of the whole frame to accelerate the attacking speed. The
search region of the tth frame is cropped from Xt at the center of predictive result of
frame t − 1, i.e., bat−1, and the trackers can be reformulated as φθ′(Xt,T,bat−1) and
φθ(Xt,T,b
a
t−1). We will discuss the attack results without b
a
t−1 in the experiments.
∗∗We use 30 as the attack interval since videos are usually at 30 fps and such setup naturally
utilizes the potential delay between 29th and 30th frames.
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Algorithm 1: Online adversarial perturbations for TA
Input: A video V = {Xt}T1 ; the object template T;
targeted trajectory {ptrt }; the attacked tracker
φθ(·); the tracker to perform attack: φθ′(·).
Output: Adversarial Perturbations {Et}T1 .
Initialize the incremental perturbation set E as empty;
for t = 2 to T do
Loading frameXt;
ifmod(t, 30) = 0 then
max_iter = 10;
Empty E ;
t0 = t;
else
max_iter = 2;
t = SPARK(φθ′(Xt+E ,T,bat−1),ptrt ,max_iter);
Add t to E = {τ}t−1t0 ;
Et =
∑ E ;
(yat ,b
a
t ) = argmaxyit φθ(Xt +Et,T,b
a
t−1);
t = t+ 1;
Abstract
xxx
1. Introduction
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[1]
1
We perform both UA and TA against
visual tracking and summarize the at-
tack process of SPARK for TA in Algo-
rithm 1. At frame t, we first load a clean
frame Xt. If t cannot be evenly divisible
by 30, we optimize the objective func-
tion, i.e., Eq. 12, with 2 iterations and
get t. Then, we add t into E that stores
previous incremental perturbations, i.e.,
{τ}t−1t0 , and obtain Et =
∑ E . If t can
be evenly divisible by 30, we clear E and
start a new round attack.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Setting
Datasets. We select 4 widely used datasets, i.e., OTB100 [57], VOT2018 [27], UAV123
[42], and LaSOT [12] as subject datasets. OTB100 and VOT2018 are general datasets
that contain 100 videos and 60 videos. UAV123 focuses videos captured by UAV and
includes 123 videos and LaSOT is a large scale dataset containing 280 testing videos.
Models. Siamese network [1,18,32,65,31,13] is a dominant tracking scheme that
achieves top accuracy with beyond real-time speed. We select SiamRPN-based trackers
[32,31] that use AlexNet [29], MobileNetv2 [25], and ResNet-50 [22] as backbones,
since they are built on the same pipeline and achieve the state-of-the-art performance on
various benchmarks. We also study the attacks on online udpating variants of SiamRPN-
based trackers and the SiamDW tracker [63].
Metrics. We evaluate the effectiveness of adversarial perturbations on the basis of
center location error (CLE) between predicted bounding boxes and the ground truth
or targeted positions. In particular, given the bounding box annotation at frame t, i.e.,
bant , we say that a tracker locates an object successfully, if we have CLE(bt,b
an
t ) =
‖ce(bt) − ce(bant )‖2 < 20 where bt is the predicted box [57]. Similarly, we say an
attacker succeeds at frame t when ‖ce(bt) − ptrt ‖2 < 20 where ptrt is the tth position
on a given targeted trajectory. With above notations, we define precision drop for UA,
success rate for TA, and MAP for both UA and TA: (1) Prec. Drop: Following [54]
and [58], for UA, we use precision drop of a tracker (after attacking) to evaluate the
generated adversarial perturbations. The precision of a tracker is the rate of frames
where the tracker can locate the object successfully. (2) Succ. Rate: For TA, Succ. Rate
denotes the rate of frames where an attack method fools a tracker successfully. (3)
MAP: Following [55], we use the mean absolute perturbation (MAP) to measure the
distortion of adversarial perturbations. For a video dataset containing D videos, we
have MAP = 1D∗K
∑
d
∑
k
1
M∗C
∑
i
∑
c |Ek,d(i, c)|, where K, M and C refer to the
number of frames, pixels and channels, respectively.
Configuration. For TA, the targeted trajectory, i.e., {ptrt }T1 , is constructed by adding
random offset values to the targeted position of previous frame, i.e., ptrt = p
tr
t−1+∆p,
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where ∆p is in the range of 1 to 10. The generated trajectories are often more challeng-
ing than manual ones due to their irregular shapes.
4.2 Comparison Results
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Fig. 4: An TA example based on BIM and SPARK. We use
a spiral line as the targeted trajectory that embraces the
object at most of the time and makes the TA challenge.
Baselines. Up to present, there still lacks
research about adversarial attack on on-
line object tracking. Therefore, we com-
pare with baselines by constructing basic
attacks and extending the existing video
attack technique. To further demonstrate
the advantages of SPARK over existing
methods, we extend the BA-E in Table 1
such that it has the same configuration
with SPARK for a more fair compari-
son. To be specific, original BA-E attacks
each frame with 10 iterations. However,
in Algorithm 1, SPARK attacks every 30 frames with 10 iterations while the frame in
interval are attacked with only 2 iterations. We configure the new BA-E with the simi-
lar iteration strategy and adopt different optimization methods (i.e., FGSM, BIM [30],
MI-FGSM [10], and C&W). In addition, we tried our best to compare with the exist-
ing method, i.e., [55] designed for action recognition. However, it uses all frames of a
video to predict the category and cannot directly be used for attacking online tracking.
We made an extension of it, i.e., when attacking at frame t, the previous 30 frames are
used to generate the adversarial.
Results. Table 2 shows the TA/UA results on the four datasets. Column Org. Prec.
gives the precision of the original tracker. Due to the large evaluation effort, for UAV123
and LaSOT, we only perform the more comprehensive comparison on the smaller model,
i.e., SiamRPN-AlexNet.
We observe that: 1) Compared with the existing attacks, SPARK achieves the high-
est Prec. Drop for UA and Succ. Rate for TA on most of datasets and models. For
the results of attacking SiamRPN-Res50 on OTB100, SPARK gets slightly smaller
Proc. Drop than MI-FGSM but generates more imperceptible perturbations. 2) SPARK
generates imperceptible perturbations. When attacking SiamRPN-AlexNet on all datasets,
SPARK always gets more imperceptible perturbations than FGSM, BIM, MI-FGSM,
and C&W. [55] produces the smallest perturbations but the attacking is not effective.
Similar results can be also found on other three datasets. 3) In general, it is more dif-
ficult to attack deeper models for all attacks, since the Prec. Drop and Succ. Rate of
almost all attacks gradually become smaller as the models become more complex.
In summary, the results of Table 1 and 2 indicate the effectiveness of SPARK in at-
tacking the tracking models with small distortions. In addition to the quantitative results,
we give a concrete example base on BIM and SPARK (see Fig. 4). Compared with BIM,
SPARK lets the SiamRPN-AlexNet tracker always produces bounding boxes on the tar-
geted trajectory with a sparse perturbation, indicating the effectiveness of SPARK.
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Table 2: Attacking three models with proposed SPARK method on OTB100 and VOT2018 for both UA and TA. The
comparison results of 5 existing attack methods are also reported. The results on two larger datasets, i.e., UAV123
and LaSOT, for attacking SiamRPN-AlexNet are presented. The best three results are highlighted by red, green,
and blue, respectively.
SiamRPN Attacks
Untargreted Attack (UA) Targeted Attack (TA)
OTB100 VOT2018 OTB100 VOT2018
Org. Prec. (%) Prec. Drop (%) MAP Org. Prec. (%) Prec. Drop (%) MAP Succ. Rate (%) MAP Succ. Rate (%) MAP
AlexNet
FGSM 85.3 8.0 1.24 65.8 13.6 1.24 7.9 1.24 4.3 1.24
BIM 85.3 72.1 2.17 65.8 57.4 2.28 38.8 2.14 48.5 2.10
MI-FGSM 85.3 68.4 3.70 65.8 58.2 4.31 41.8 3.18 47.0 3.17
C&W 85.3 54.2 1.31 65.8 50.6 1.26 25.7 1.27 25.7 1.23
Wei 85.3 25.9 0.21 65.8 33.6 0.30 16.0 0.27 20.9 0.24
SPARK 85.3 78.9 1.04 65.8 61.6 1.03 74.6 1.36 78.9 1.38
Mob.
FGSM 86.4 6.7 1.00 69.3 14.1 0.99 7.9 1.00 3.4 0.99
BIM 86.4 37.8 1.07 69.3 46.2 1.06 30.3 1.06 32.9 1.05
MI-FGSM 86.4 42.3 1.71 69.3 46.6 1.73 33.5 1.70 32.7 1.71
C&W 86.4 23.6 1.04 69.3 28.2 1.02 13.7 1.05 8.9 1.01
Wei 86.4 39.4 0.84 69.3 27.8 0.54 11.3 0.51 7.0 0.53
SPARK 86.4 54.1 1.66 69.3 55.5 1.25 51.4 1.65 45.5 1.21
Res50
FGSM 87.8 4.5 0.99 72.8 8.1 0.99 7.7 0.92 2.9 0.99
BIM 87.8 27.0 1.10 72.8 39.1 1.10 17.1 1.09 17.0 1.08
MI-FGSM 87.8 31.9 1.72 72.8 41.8 1.75 18.8 1.71 19.5 1.72
C&W 87.8 14.6 1.03 72.8 20.4 1.01 10.0 1.04 5.3 1.01
Wei 87.8 9.7 0.65 72.8 15.7 0.68 9.7 0.78 4.8 0.69
SPARK 87.8 29.8 1.67 72.8 54.3 1.26 23.8 1.70 39.5 1.26
SiamRPN Attacks
Untargreted Attack (UA) Targreted Attack (TA)
UAV123 LaSOT UAV123 LaSOT
Org. Prec. Prec. Drop MAP Org. Prec. Prec. Drop MAP Succ. Rate MAP Succ. Rate MAP
AlexNet
FGSM 76.9 3.7 1.25 43.5 4.0 1.22 3.7 1.25 4.70 1.22
BIM 76.9 36.4 1.70 43.5 32.0 1.64 28.7 1.75 17.4 1.73
MI-FGSM 76.9 31.5 2.54 43.5 31.6 2.50 28.3 2.53 17.8 2.46
C&W 76.9 17.0 1.37 43.5 19.9 1.29 11.0 1.36 8.7 1.28
Wei 76.9 5.6 0.31 43.5 9.3 0.29 6.8 0.37 6.9 0.31
SPARK 76.9 43.6 1.13 43.5 38.2 0.93 54.8 1.06 48.9 1.09
4.3 Analysis of SPARK
Validation of the online incremental attack. We implement six variants of SPARK by
setting L ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30} in Eq. 12 to analyze how historical incremental per-
turbations affect attacking results. For example, when attacking the frame t with L = 5,
we use previous 5 incremental perturbations to generate Et. We use these SPARKs to
attack SiamRPN-AlexNet under TA on OTB100 and report the Succ. Rate, MAP, and
MAP difference (MAP Diff.(L)) in Fig. 3, where MAP Diff.(L)=MAP(SPARK(L))-
MAP(SPARK(L− 1)). We see that: 1) the Succ. Rate increases with the growing of L.
It demonstrates that historical incremental perturbations do help achieve more effective
attack. 2) Although MAP also gets larger as the L increases, the MAP Diff. gradually
decrease. This validates the advantages of SPARK, that is, it can not only leverage tem-
poral transferability effectively but also maintaining the imperceptible perturbations.
Results under Challenging Attributes. OTB dataset contains 11 subsets corre-
sponding to 11 interference attributes††. Fig. 5 shows results of six methods for SiamRPN-
AlexNet on 11 subsets. We observe that: 1) SPARK has much larger Prec. Drop and
Succ. Rate than baselines on all subsets except the LR one for both UA and TA. 2) The
advantages of SPARK over baselines for TA is more significant than that for UA. 3)
BIM, Wei, MIFGSM, and C&W are much more effective under the LR attribute than
others. This may be caused by the limited effective information in LR frames, which
leads to less discriminative deep representation and lets the attacking more easier.
Transferability across Models. We discuss the transferability across models, which
is to apply perturbations generated from one model to another. In Table 4, the values in
††
The 11 attributes are illumination variation (IV), scale variation (SV), in-plane rotation (IPR), outplane rotation (OPR), deformation (DEF), occlusion (OCC), motion
blur (MB), fast motion (FM), background clutter (BC), out-of-view (OV), and low resolution (LR).
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Table 3: Left sub-table shows the results of attacking DSiamRPN trackers on OTB100 for UA and TA while the right
one presents the results of attacking SiamDW trackers.
UA Attack TA Attack UA Attack TA Attack
Org. Prec.(%) Prec. Drop(%) Succ. Rate(%) Org. Prec.(%) Prec. Drop(%) Succ. Rate(%)
DSiam-AlexNet 86.6 78.5 65.9 SiamDW-CIResNet 83.0 58.1 21.5
DSiam-Mob. 87.8 56.8 44.4 SiamDW-CIResNext 81.7 74.2 29.4
DSiam-Res50 90.3 37.1 20.4 SiamDW-CIResIncep 82.3 70.2 30.8
0.66
0.74
0.76
0.78
S
u
c
c
. 
R
a
te
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
M
A
P
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
M
A
P
 D
iff
.
10 15 20 25 305 10 15 20 25 305 10 15 20 25 30
L L L
(a) (b) (c)
FGSM BIM MIFGSM C&W Wei SPARK
OV
OCC
IPR
BC
OPR
DEF
IV
SV
LR
FM
MB
OV
OCC
IPR
BC
OPR
DEF
IV
SV
LR
FM
MB
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
(d)
Fig. 5: (a) and (b) are the Succ. Rate and MAP of six variants of SPARK under TA for SiamRPN-AlexNet. The
six variants are built by using different number of previous perturbations for Eq. (12) and (c) shows the MAP
difference between neighboring variants.(d) Attacking SiamRPN-AlexNet with the six compared methods on the
11 subsets of OTB100 for both TA and UA.
the UA and TA parts are the Prec. Drop and Succ. Rate, respectively. We see that the
transferability across models also exists in attacking object tracking. All attack meth-
ods lead to the precision drop to some extent. For example, the perturbations generated
by SiamRPN-Res50 cause the precision of SiamRPN-Mob. drop 16.1, which is a huge
performance degradation in tracking evaluation. For TA, after transferability, the suc-
cess rate is around 6.5 for all cases. Such limited transferability may be caused by the
insufficient iterations during online process and can be further studied in the future.
SPARK without object template T. As discussed in Section 3.4 and Algorithm 1,
the tracked object, i.e., the template T, should be given during attack. Here, we demon-
strate that we can realize effective attack without T. Specifically, given the first frame
of an online video, we use SSD [36] to detect all possible objects in the frame and select
the object nearest to the frame center as the target object. The basic principle behind
this is that a tracker usually starts working when the object is within the camera’s cen-
ter view. As presented in Table 4, without the specified T, SPARK-noT also acheive
71.0% Prec. Drop under UA on OTB100 and is slightly lower than the original SPARK.
SPARK without the attacked tracker’s predictions. In Algorithm 1, we detail
that our SPARK is performed on the search region of φθ(·) and require the attacked
tracker’s prediction, i.e., bat−1, as an additional input, which might limit the application
of our method since we might not access to the attacked tracker’s predictions. A simple
solution is to replace the bat−1 in the Algorithm 1 with b
a′
t−1, i.e., we can perform attack
on the search region of φθ′(·) and propagate the perturbations to the whole frame. As
shown in Table 4, without the attacked tracker’s predictions, SPARK-nobat gets 67.7%
Prec. Drops under UA on OTB100 which is slightly lower than the original SPARK.
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Table 4: The left subtable shows the transferability between subject models (i.e., AlexNet, MobileNetv2, and
ResNet50) on OTB100. Values in UA and TA are Proc. Drop and Succ. Rate, respectively. The right subtable shows
the results of attacking SiamRPN-AlexNet on OTB100 without object template T or attacked tracker’s prediction
bat . The third row of this subtable is the original results of SPARK in Table 2.
Proc. Drop of UA from Succ. Rate of TA from Untargreted Attack (UA) Targeted Attack (TA)
AlexNet Mob.Net Res50 AlexNet Mob.Net Res50 Org. Prec. Prec. Drop Succ. Rate
SiamRPN-AlexNet 78.9 6.7 2.0 74.6 6.2 6.7 SPARK-noT 85.3 71.0 50.6
SiamRPN-Mob. 3.5 54.1 2.7 6.3 51.4 6.6 SPARK-nobat 85.3 67.7 46.2
SiamRPN-Res50 7.5 16.1 29.8 6.2 6.5 23.8 SPARK 85.3 78.9 74.6
4.4 Attacking other tracking frameworks
Transferability to online updating trackers. We construct three online updating track-
ers with dynamic Siamese tracking (DSiam) [18], and obtain trackers: DSiamRPN-
AlexNet, MobileNetV2, and ResNet-50. We then use the adversarial perturbations from
SiamRPN-AlexNet, MobileNetV2, and ResNet-50 to attack the DSiamRPN-based track-
ers. In Table 3, we observe that: 1) DSiam indeed improves the precision of three
SiamRPN-based trackers according to the results in Table 2. 2) The adversarial pertur-
bations from SiamRPNs is still effective for DSaim versions with the precision drops
being 78.5%, 56.8%, and 37.1% which are larger than the results in Table 2. This is be-
cause DSiamRPN-based trackers use online tracking results that may have been fooled
by attacks to update models and make them less effective, thus are easily attacked.
Attacking SiamDW [63]. We validate the generality of SPARK by attacking an-
other tracker, i.e., SiamDW [63] that won the VOT-19 RGB-D challenge and achieved
the runner-ups in VOT-19 Long-term and RGB-T challenges [28]. As shown in right
sub-table of the Table 3, without changing any attack parameters, SPARK significantly
reduces the precision of SiamDW trackers under the UA, demonstrating its generality.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored adversarial perturbations for misleading the online visual ob-
ject tracking along an incorrect (untarged attack, UA) or specified (targeted attack, TA)
trajectory. An optimization-based method, namely spatial-aware online incremental
attack (SPARK), was proposed to overcome the challenges introduced in this new task.
SPARK optimizes perturbations with a L2,1 regularization norm and considers the in-
fluence of historical attacking results, thus is more effective. Experimental results on
OTB100, VOT2018, UAV123, and LaSOT showed that SPARK successfully fool the
state-of-the-art trackers.
6 Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC)
under Grant 61671325, Grant 61572354, Grant 61672376, Grant U1803264, and Grant
61906135, the Singapore National Research Foundation under the National Cyberse-
curity R&D Program No. NRF2018NCR-NCR005-0001 and the NRF Investigatorship
No. NRFI06-2020-0022, and the National Satellite of Excellence in Trustworthy Soft-
ware System No. NRF2018NCR-NSOE003-0001. We also gratefully acknowledge the
support of NVIDIA AI Tech Center (NVAITC) to our research.
SPARK: Spatial-aware Online Incremental Attack Against Visual Tracking 15
7 Supplementary Material
7.1 Attacking Correlation Filter-based Trackers
Correlation filter (CF) is a dominant tracking framework that can achieves well bal-
ance between tracking speed and accuracy. However, most of the CF-based trackers are
not end-to-end architectures and use hand-craft features. Hence, it is difficult to attack
them via the white-box setup and is meaningful to explore if SPARK could attack CF-
based trackers by using deep tracking frameworks, e.g., SiamRPN-based trackers. As
shown in Table I, the adversarial examples from SiamRPN-Alex can reduce all tested
CF-based trackers having different features, which demonstrates that the transiferability
of our attack across different trackers and features exists. In terms of different features,
the HOG feature is easier attacked when compared with the gray feature, hybird fea-
ture (i.e., HOG+CN), and deep feature (e.g., VGG).
Table I: Untargeted attack (UA) for correlation filter-based trackers, e.g., MOSSE [2], KCF [24],
BACF [15], STRCF [32], and ECO [8] with the perturbations generated from SiamRPN-AlexNet.
MOSSE KCF BACF STRCF ECO
Features Gray HOG HOG+CN HOG+CN VGG
Org. Prec. (%) 41.7 69.2 70.5 72.3 89.6
Proc. Drop (%) 0.2 3.3 2.1 1.5 0.9
7.2 Speed Analysis
We have reported the time cost of our SPARK in Table. 1 in the submission and shown
that SPARK is more suitable for attacking online trackers than three basic attack meth-
ods due to the balance between time cost and attack Succ. Rate. Please find details in
Section 3.3. Compared with trackers’ cost shown in Table. III, the time cost of our at-
tack method increases as the tracking model becomes larger under the white-box attack.
In particular, when attacking SiamRPN-Alex, SPARK achieves near real-time attack-
ing. Although the attack speed decreases with more complex models, the corresponding
tracking speed is also slower and lets the influence of decreased attacking be smaller. We
Table II: Time cost of attacks w.r.t. different trackers on OTB100 dataset.
SiamRPN AlexNet MobileNetV2 Res50
Track cost per frame (ms) 9.3 37.6 42.1
Attack cost per frame (ms) 41.4 126.9 156.3
Track speed (fps) 108.4 15.3 16.8
Attack speed (fps) 24.3 8.0 6.4
can reduce the high time cost of attacking larger models (e.g., MobileNetv2 and Res50)
by using the light one (e.g., AlexNet) due to the existence of the transferability between
models as discussed in Section 4.3 and Table 4. Specifically, we attack three trackers,
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i.e., SiamRPN-Alex/Mob./Res50, via SPARK with the adversarial perturbations gener-
ated from SiamRPN-Alex. Then, we calculate the attack’s online speed as well as the
three trackers’ speed. As shown in the following Table. III, the speed of SPARK base
on SiamRPN-Alex can reach near real-time speed (around 25 fps) for different trackers,
which means our method is suitable for attacking real-time online trackers.
Table III: Time cost of attacking trackers on OTB100. The adversarial perturbations are generated
from SiamRPN-Alex.
SiamRPN AlexNet MobileNetV2 Res50
Track speed (fps) 108.4 15.3 16.8
Attack speed (fps) 24.3 23.1 22.7
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